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FIsHooKs AND TRIPWIRE:
A PARTICULARIZED IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
RIGHT TO ROAM TO THE APPALACHIAN TRAIL

Katherine J. Moore*
No man made the land. it is the originalinheritance of the whole
species ... The land of every country belongs to the people of that
country.
- John Stewart Mill

I. INTRODUCTION
In order to reach Erwin, Tennessee from the southern
terminus of the Appalachian Trail, a hiker must traverse 342.8
miles 2-not even a quarter of the length of the trail.3 While hiking
those 342.8 miles, hikers have confronted and conquered hundreds
of challenges, including gear mishaps, physical injury, mental
exhaustion, and dwindling finances. 4 Hikers prepare in advance to
overcome many of these expected obstacles, however, few if any
hikers expect to run into fishhooks hanging dangerously at eye
level. 5 The U.S. Forest Service officials blame these dangling
fishhooks, invisible trip-lines, and threatening signs on a "dispute

*Production Editor, KENTUCKY JOURNAL OF EQUINE, AGRICULTURE, & NATURAL
RESOURCES LAW, 2018-2019; B.A. 2013, Transylvania University; J.D. expected May 2019,
University of Kentucky.
I John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy With Some of Their
Applications to Social Philosophy 142, 200-01 (People's ed., London, Longmans, Green,
Reader, & Dyer 1866).
2 See Hiking Distance Calculator from Springer Mountain, Ga., to Nolichucky
River-Erwin, Tenn., TRAIL DISTANCE, https://traildistance.com/ [https://perma.cc/59UH326T].
3 See NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, https://www.nps.gov/appa/index.htm
[https://perma.cc/NX3M-8Q2J].
See Zach Davis, 21 Appalachian Trail Statistics That Will Surprise, Entertain
and Inform You, REI CooP J., https://www.rei.com/blog/hike/21-appalachian-trailstatistics-that-will-surprise-entertain-and-inform-you [https://perma.cclYEY7-Y3YA].
5 See Appalachian TrailHikers Get Warning, THE WASHINGTON POST (July 10,
7
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/lifestyle/1990/0 /10/appalachian-trail1990),
7
hikers-get-warning/01bfd919-9108-4f84-a84c-e904ffb766c7/?utm-term=. 505a325d3ec
[https://perma.cc/4Q2P-HL5S].
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between the government and landowners who fear their land will
be seized."6
The Appalachian Trail (AT) is known as America's most
famous footpath. 7 It was conceptualized and implemented by
progressive forester, Benton MacKaye, in 1921 in an attempt "to
provide jobs for rural workers, opportunities for spiritual and
physical health ... and land protection from profit-motivated
exploiters."8 The Appalachian Trail Conference (now Appalachian
Trail Conservancy, hereinafter ATC) was organized as a volunteerbased nonprofit in 1925 and is responsible for managing and
protecting the trail.9 In the 1930s the ATC "relied on informal,
handshake agreements between" their own volunteers and private
landowners in order to build the trail-agreements that proved
insufficient after World War 11.10
The end of World War II brought heightened timber
production, city sprawl, and an increase in outdoor recreation, all
of which combined to substantially interfere with the initial route
of the AT. 1 If the AT was going to last, the ATC needed help from
the federal government. This call for help was.answered when
Congress passed the National Trails Act in 1968, officially naming
the AT part of the National Park system. 12 In 1978, the Act was
dramatically amended in order to "expedite land acquisition for the
AT corridor." 3 Through a series of "get tough" acquisition policies
introduced in 1977, the park service was able to condemn property
if the land fell inside the park and the landowner "attempted to
improve or develop a structure on an unimproved property."' 4 This
kept the agency from having to compensate landowners for any
future rise in property value. Not surprisingly, these policies
spurred opposition to the park service and concern about the
"expanding power of the federal government and its infringement
... on property rights." 5

6 Id.

7 Sarah Mittlefehldt, The Peoples Path: Conflict and Cooperation in the
Acquisition of the Appalachian Trail, 15 ENvrL. HIST. 4, 643 (2010).
8 Id. at 646.
9 See id. at 644.
i0 Id. at 647.
I1See id.
12 See id. at 649.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 650.
15

Id. at 651.
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Today, the AT is approximately ninety-nine percent public
land that the government acquired either through eminent
domain, 16 consenting sales by private landowners, easements,
exchanges, or donations. 7 About 10 percent of private landowners
along the trail have refused government offers, often resulting in
eminent domain acquisition and deep-seated bitterness against
the AT. 1s Some resentful, angry landowners have retaliated
against eminent domain takings by burning AT shelters,
9
intimidating hikers, or vandalizing vehicles parked at trailheads.'
Although the United States often boasts its history of
strong property rights laws, the concept of the right to roam is
seemingly foreign here. The right to roam, or freedom to roam, is
the general public's right to freely traverse and access public or
privately owned land for exercise and recreation. 20 The United
States does not recognize the right to roam and instead looks to
government acquisition of private land to build a vast inventory of
public lands for individual access. 2 1 The right to roam is recognized
in several European countries, including Great Britain, Scotland,
and Scandinavia. 22 For example, Great Britain and Scotland
enacted the Countryside and Rights of Way Act (CRoW) in 2000
and The Land Reform (Scotland) Act in 2003, respectively. 23

16

TRAIL

See 75th Anniversaryofthe Completion of the Appalachian Trail, APPALACHIAN
CONSERVANCY,

http://www.appalachiantrail.org/promo/75th-anniversary

-

[https://perma.cc/C75C-4RC4].
17 See Debbie M. Price, Landowners Losing to Appalachian Trail Acquisition:If
the National Park Service Needs Land, it Tries to Negotiate with the Owner. But if the
SUN (Jan.
Owner Refuses to Sell, the Government Can Condemn the Property, BALTIMORE
99 7 29
0 103_eminenthttp://articles.baltimoresun.com/1997-01-29/news/1
1997),
29,
domain-appalachian-trail-physioc [https://perma.cc/3N8C-SRLP.
18 See Debbie M. Price, Appalachian Trails Neighbors Fightinga Losing Battle
997 03
with US. ParkService, BALTIMORE SUN (Mar. 9, 1997), http://articles.latimes.com/1
09/news/mn-36391_1_appalachian-trail [https://perma.cc/3BVS-9J4K].
19 See Getting to the Trail, APPALACHIANTRAIL.ORG,

http://appalachiantrail.org/home/explore-the-trailltransportation-options
[https://perma.cclD2YB-CGCV]; see Appalachian Trail Hikers Get Warning, supra note 4.
20 See Jess Kyle, Of Constitutions and Cultures: The British Right to Roam and
American PropertyLaw, 44 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10898, 10898-99 (2014).
21 See id.
22 See John A. Lovett, ProgressivePropertyinAction: The Land Reform (Scotland)
Act 2003, 89 NEB. L. REV. 739, 743 (2011) (discussing the right to roam in Scotland and
Great Britain); see also Heidi Gorovitz Robertson, Public Access to Private Land for
Walking:En vironmentaland IndividualResponsibilityAs Rationalefor Limiting the Right
to Exclude, 23 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 211, 211-12, 261 (2011) (discussing the right to
roam in Scandinavia and the European continent).
23 See Kyle, supra note 20, at 10898; see also Lovett, supra note 22, at 741, 766.
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CRoW,

in

particular,

does

not

provide

the

"landowner

compensation for public access." 2 4
As applied to the United States as a whole, it is likely that
the right to roam would fail miserably. William Blackstone's
conception of property as the "sole and despotic dominion which
one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world,
in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the
universe" continues to be championed by Americans today. 25 But,
what if the right to roam is solely applied to the narrow corridor of
the AT? When it comes to the AT it seems that the right to exclude
may be hindering a more socially beneficial use of property,
impeding conservation efforts, and fueling landowner resentment.
Applied to the AT, the right to roam might appease private
landowners in the long term, allowing them to maintain ownership
over property that has been in their family for centuries, while also
protecting the environment encompassing the trail and those
enjoying it from acts of vandalism.
With the codification and enactment of right to roam
statutes and acts in several European countries, many scholars
have weighed in on both the advantages and disadvantages of such
a right. Professor Henry Smith of Harvard Law School posits
"giving the right-to-roam stick to a neighbor or to the public affects
the value of the remaining property." 26 Professors Jonathan Klick
and Gideon Parchomovsky of the University of Pennsylvania Law
School built upon Smith's warning, explaining that CRoW's
"passage led to statistically significant and substantively large
declines in property values in areas ... that were more intensively
affected by the Act relative to areas where less land was designated
for increased access." 2 7 More importantly, scholars simply do not
see a way in which the right to roam would work in America with
its explicit Constitutional property protections and case law
emphasizing "the landowner's right to exclude others from
property." 28 Professor Jerry L. Anderson best encapsulates the
above by stating "[s]hort of a revolution in American thinking" the

24

See Kyle, supra note 20, at 10898.

25 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES,
*2.
26 Henry E. Smith, Propertyis Not Just a Bundle

ofRights, 8(3) EcoN. J. WATCH
279, 286 (Sept. 2011).
27 Jonathan Klick & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Value ofthe Right to
Exclude:An
EmpiricalAssessment, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 917 (2017).
2 See Kyle, supra note 20, at 10901.
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possibility of America accepting a statutory right to roam is
unlikely. 29
In contrast, Professor Brian Sawers argues that the right
to roam was an important part of early American history and
present-day landowners "would gain something of value from a
right to roam, even at the same time that they lose the right to
exclude." 30 Sawers explains that "[11andowners could expect an
31
'average reciprocity of advantage,' thus no taking." It is also
argued that the right to roam increases development potential on
rural parcels that cannot be used for agrarian purposes and would
32
not have public foot traffic otherwise. The combination of the
right to roam and private ownership create a market in which
33
restaurants, waysides, and hostels are profitable. Scholars also
argue that unimproved lands, like those the AT pass through, do
not present "spatial or temporal conflicts," as "these lands are
rarely used by their owners ... and public use will usually be
light."34
This note asserts that applying the right to roam to the AT
would foster an improved relationship between private landowners
and the trail, resulting in safer conditions for those enjoying the
trail, diminished need for government implementation of eminent
domain, and better conservation of the "national significant scenic,
35
historic, natural or cultural qualities" of the trail itself. In Part
II, this note will discuss the history and current state of the right
to roam in America. Part III will examine relevant right to roam
statutes codified in Europe and analyze the advantages and
disadvantages of each, specifically why the right to roam was the
most practical application of property law. Finally, Part IV of this
note will demonstrate that the application of the right to roam to
the AT as introduced through an amendment to the National
Trails System Act of 1968 would alleviate disputes between private
landowners and the government, promote protection of the trail,

29 Jerry L. Anderson, Britain'sRight to Roam Redefining the Landowner'sBundle
ofSticks, 19 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 375, 433 (2007).
30
Brian Sawers, Article: The Right to Exclude from UnimprovedLand, 83 TEMP.
L. REV. 665, 670 (2011).

a' Id.

See id. at 691.
See id.
34 Id. at 695.
35 16 U.S.C. § 1242 (2018).
32

33
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and build upon existing statutory language, which lends itself to
the underlying principles of the right to roam.
II. AMERICA'S PAST AND PRESENT RELATIONSHIP WITH THE RIGHT

TO ROAM

While

the

general

perception

is

of

an

America

fundamentally entrenched in private property rights; she actually
has a rich history of traveling rights and public access to commons,
which demonstrates the appropriate foundation for presenting a
specific right to roam regime. Section A will discuss examples of a
modified right to roam found in America before and during the
twentieth century. For example, in early America, the public had
the right to travel freely on unfenced land, even if landowners
objected. 36 Section B will examine the current state of the right to
roam in American property law and ask if any remnants of early
American public access remain in today's law.
A. EarlyAmerica
Characteristics of a legal right to roam in America can be
found as early as the seventeenth century in New England hunting
laws. 3 7 Laws were created that "allowed New Englanders to cross
undeveloped private land to fish or hunt fowl on public lakes"38 and
soon after were changed to allow access to hunting on such
undeveloped private land. While the United States Constitution
did not protect the right of Americans to enter unenclosed land to
hunt, both Vermont and Pennsylvania "ratified constitutions
recognizing and protecting such a right."3 9 In fact, the Vermont
constitutional provision is still in effect today, stating: "The
inhabitants of this State shall have liberty in seasonable times, to
hunt and fowl on the lands they hold, and on other lands not
inclosed, and in like manner to fish in all boatable and other waters
(not private property) under proper regulations ... "4

See Sawers, supra note 30, at 665.
See Mark R. Sigmon, Hunting andPostingon PrivateLand-inAmerica, 54 Duke
L. J. 549, 555 (2004).
36

37

38 Id.

39 Id.
40

at 556.

VT. CONST.

§

67.
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While Vermont and Pennsylvania were the only two states
with constitutional provisions, many early state courts recognized
the right to hunt on unenclosed private land. 41 In fact, in a 1922
U.S. Supreme Court case, McKee v. Gratz,4 2 the court "recognized
a presumption in American law that unenclosed land was open to
hunters." 43 Extraordinarily, in 1984 Justice Thurgood Marshall
reaffirmed the following language from McKee:
The strict rule of the English common law as to entry
upon a close must be taken to be mitigated by
common understanding with regard to the large
expanses of unenclosed and uncultivated land in
many parts at least of this country. Over these it is
customary to wander, shoot and fish at will until the
owner sees fit to prohibit it. A license may be implied
from the habits of the country."
The last portion of the language above demonstrates a
third method used to ensure access to private land for
hunters-posting statutes. If a landowner wanted to prohibit
entry upon their land by hunters, he needed to post a sign
declaring that hunting was not allowed.45 "These statutes fostered
the presumption that private land was open to hunters and
required affirmative acts on the part of landowners to exclude
hunters." 46 Early state hunting laws dating back to the 1650s
demonstrate that public access to private land was routine in pretwentieth century America and can be considered a background
principle of law. 4 7

&

Another example of early American law with underlying
principles similar to the right to roam are found in laws protecting
wandering cattle. "While there is evidence of a person's right to
48
roam, the historical record of livestock roaming is even richer."
In 1854, the Supreme Court of Alabama decided Nashville

41 See Sigmon, supra note 37.
42 McKee v. Gratz, 260 U.S. 127, 136 (1922).
4 Sigmon, supra note 37, at 557.
4 Id.
4 See id. at 558.
46 Id.
4 See id.
48

Sawers, supra note 30, at 674.
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Chattanooga Railroad Co. v. Peacock, which held that a railroad
was liable for a farmer's cow killed by a locomotive while "roaming
at large." 49 Although the cow was roaming at large, the railroad
was still liable because "under the Alabama Code unenclosed lands
were treated as common pasture." so This case and a similar
Georgia case, Macon & Western Railroad Co. v. Lester,
demonstrate that private landowners either had to protect their
land by fencing it in or allow trespass by roaming cattle.5 ' The
Alabama court also noted that railroads could not insist on owners
of cattle preventing such cattle from wandering onto train tracks. 52
The history of livestock roaming in America helps to
"supplement the more limited evidence of human roaming," which
gives a better understanding and more complete picture of open
access in the early United States. 53 First, "foraging livestock" are
much more intrusive than "wandering people." 5 4 For example,
freely roaming livestock can easily trample, consume, or generally
destroy other's crops, grazing land, or structures. Humans are
often passive and obedient travelers gaining access in order to
arrive at a specific destination. Wandering livestock present a
nuisance, where wandering humans are typically paid no mind by
private landowners. Therefore, it is intuitive to surmise the open
range that first existed for livestock included a right to roam for
individuals. Where there was an open range, there were wandering
animals, and owners eventually needed to find their livestock,
which often required public access to private land. "When
lawmakers expand landowner rights, the most intrusive use is the
first to be limited."55
Second, private land was first enclosed to keep out
livestock, not humans. While fencing private land allowed
landowners to keep in (or out) wandering livestock, it "did not
translate into a landowner's right to exclude, fencing livestock out
invariably meant that the public had a right to roam." 5 6 It is
important to remember that in early America (particularly pre-

49

Nashville & C. R. Co. v. Peacock, 25 Ala. 229, 231 (Ala. 1852).

50 I

See Macon & W. R.R. Co. v. Lester, 30 Ga. 911, 914 (Ga. 1860).
See Nashville, 25 Ala. 229 (Ala. 1852).
53 Sawers, supra note 30, at 674.
54 Id. at 675.
~565 Id.
d.
51
52
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twentieth century) fences and roads were not in abundance and
57
"people were accustomed to crossing unenclosed land."
While public access hunting is one of the most prolific
examples of a modified right to roam in early America, public
access for fishing and gathering also provide examples of a legal
right to roam woven into the foundation of early American
property law. In Marsh v. Colby (1818), the Michigan Supreme
Court found that "it has always been customary ...

to permit the

58
public to take fish in all the small lakes and ponds of the State."
Similar to hunting, fishing was a popular public use of unimproved
land.

B. CurrentState of the Right to Roam in American PropertyLaw
In the late nineteenth century, along with the piece-meal
closing of the open range, "landowners' right to exclude people
expanded."5 9 A Georgia court held that this process of open range
enclosure "would require a revolution in our people's habits of
thought and action," giving weight to the assumption that the
expansion of a landowner's right to exclude prompted similar
reactions.60 Throughout the years, a private property owner's right
to exclude continued to gain support in the form of statutes and
case law, culminating in the 1979 United States Supreme Court
decision Kaiser Aetna v. United States.6 ' While the case focuses
much more attention on navigation than the right to exclude, it
makes the "sweeping conclusion that property must include a right
to exclude." 62 Courts have fallen back on Kaiser Aetna's broad
right to exclude, using it as precedent even though KaiserAetna's
factual background is unusual and the cases citing it are
dissimilar. The case involved a disagreement over a dredged
passage between a privately-owned lagoon and the ocean. Once
dredged by marina developers, the Army Corps of Engineers
sought a navigational servitude over the lagoon. The majority held
that "the right to exclude, so universally held to be a fundamental

Id. at 676.
Marsh v. Colby, 39 Mich. 626, 627 (Mich. 1978).
59 Sawers, supra note 30, at 680.
60 Macon & W. R.R. Co. v. Lester, 30 Ga. 911, 914 (Ga. 1860).
61 Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 44 U.S. 164 (1979).
57
58

62 Sawers, supra note 30, at 667.
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element of the property right, falls within [the] category of
interests
that
the
Government
cannot
take
without
compensation."6 3
The holding in Kaiser Aetna is problematic because it is
grounded in three questionable cases. The first, United States v.
Pueblo of San Ildefonso, discusses exclusion through the lens of
Indian title, 64 which is different because "Indian tribes are
sovereigns, not proprietors, so exclusive possession establishes
political boundaries, not private rights." 65 Second, the Kaiser
Aetna court cites dicta from UnitedStates v. Lutz,66 which is about
the rights a property owner has over their chattel, including the
right to exclude. However, the "opinion does not address property
in land." 6 7 Third, the Kaiser Aetna court only partially cites
Justice Brandeis' dissent in International News Service v.
68
AssociatedPress.
The KaiserAetna court cuts Brandeis' message
in two, only including the section that says "an essential element
of individual property is the legal right to exclude others from
enjoying it," without including the rest of the sentence, which goes
on to say "if the property is affected with a public interest, the right
of exclusion is qualified."69 Kaiser Aetna has been credited with
standing for the proposition that "the U.S. Constitution defined
property to include a right to exclude, a right beyond a state's
power to regulate."7 0
A majority of states presume land is open to the public until
the landowner acts to close access. For example, posting rules, as
discussed in Section A, have stood the test of time and are still
widely utilized by many states. "About half the states have enacted
'posting' rules, which generally allow access to private land for
hunting, without the landowner's specific permission, unless the
land has been posted with 'no trespassing' signs." 71 More
importantly, "in at least some of these states, the statutory
requirement of posting to prohibit access could apply to

Kaiser, 444 U.S. at 179-80.
United States v. Pueblo of San Ildefonso, 513 F.2d 1383 (Ct. Cl. 1975).
6 Sawers, supra note 30, at 667.
6 United States v. Lutz, 295 F.2d 736 (5th Cir. 1961).
67 Sawers, supra note 30, at 668.
68 Int'l News Serv. v. Assoc. Press, 248 U.S. 215, 248-67 (1918) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
69 Id. at 250.
7o Sawers, supra note 30, at 668.
71 Anderson, supranote 29, at 422.
63

64
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recreational access as well as to hunting, which would allow a
72
hiker to presume permission to walk across unposted lands."
While posting statutes do not necessarily equate to the right to
roam, they do "codify a common law notion of implied permission
based on custom that has historically prevailed in most American
states."73 These codifications certainly exhibit characteristics of a
qualified right to roam, as they recognize an implied permission to
enter private land, but with the understanding that the landowner
may revoke this permission at any time. This is in contrast to what
could be called the more "pure" right to roam in England, which
74
establishes "irrevocable public access rights based on custom."

While there are few prominent examples easily found, an
irrevocable public access right based on custom does exist in
Oregon with regard to a recognized public right of access to
oceanfront beaches. In State exrel. Thornton v. Hay,75 the Oregon
Supreme Court dismissed the possibility of utilizing the doctrine
of prescription to allow public access and instead relied on "the
English doctrine" of custom, finding that "the public had used the
dry sand area along Oregon's Pacific coast 'as long as the land has
been inhabited."' 76 The court explained that "requiring a beach-bybeach determination based on prescription ...

would be unduly

burdensome and unnecessary,"7 7 and "ocean-front lands from the
northern

to

the

southern

border

...

ought

to be

treated

78

uniformly." In fact, in a 1993 follow-up case, Stevens v. City of
Cannon Beach,79 .the Oregon Supreme Court "determined that
[the] declaration of public access rights based on custom did not
constitute a taking of beachfront owners' property rights," and "the
public's right of access should be considered one of the 'background
principles' of state law that inhere in every property owner's
title."8 0 Together, these two cases describe a property owner as
never possessing the right to exclude the public from beaches in

7 Id. at 423.
Id.
State exrel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671, 676-77 (Or. 1969).
7
6 Anderson, supra note 29, at 425.
74

75

77 Id.
78 Thornton, 462 P.2d at 676; Anderson, supra note 29, at 425.

79 Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449, 456-57 (Or. 1993) (citing Lucas
v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028-29 (1992), andDolan v. City of Tigard, 854 P.2d
437, 442 (Or. 1993)).
80 Anderson, supra note 29, at 425.
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the first place, thus recognizing that "Thornton did not destroy a
previously existing right."8 1 Oregon's beach access doctrine based
on custom begins to look like a modified right to roam across public
land for recreational purposes. However, this "public right of
customary access is limited to beachfront property; public access
for recreational purposes in contexts other than beaches finds even
less support in the courts." 82
Overall, the right to exclude has gradually become one of
the most powerful property law tools used by American courts
today in decisions regarding public access to private land. This
development is noticeable looking back at an America that
wandered and roamed much more than it does today, with state
hunting, fishing, and gathering laws that presumed public access
to private land without an affirmative statement otherwise, as well
as an open range for livestock, implying a de facto open range for
humans. Once America began enclosing the open range, the right
to exclude people from private property was expanded across the
country. Americans have successfully divided their daily personal
lives from constant interaction with nature, moving from one airconditioned structure to the next, and doing so not on their own
two feet, but in a car. Wandering and roaming today is more likely
attributed to the homeless and hikers.
III. THE RIGHT TO RoAM IN EUROPE
The right to roam is not limited to a particular footpath;
rather, the right to roam gives wide-ranging access, "allowing the
public to wander freely over private meadows or other uncultivated
private lands." 83 Or, stated another way, "the right to roam
empowers the general public to hike and engage in minimally
intrusive recreational activities on qualifying private properties." 8 4
Section A of Part III will discuss the history, mechanics,
advantages, and disadvantages of Great Britain's Countryside and
Rights of Way Act, which was enacted in 2000. Section B will
discuss more expansive right to roam regimes found in Scotland,

81 Id.
82 Id.
83
84

Id. at 380.
Klick & Parchomovsky, supra note 27, at 935.
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under the Land Reform Scotland Act 2003, and in Scandinavia,
under what is called "everyman's right."8 5
A. GreatBritain'sCountryside and Rights of Way Act
Great Britain has a long and controversial history of the
right to roam, beginning with ancient roots in public access and
wandering, moving toward extinguishing roaming rights by
enclosing private land, then a gradual wane back toward greater
public access with the rise of the industrial revolution, and finally
turning to a present day codified right to roam statute enacted in
Great Britain.
Great Britain's Countryside and Rights of Way Act was
prefaced by the Law of Property Act of 1925 and then the Natiorial
Parks and Access to the Countryside Act of 1949.86 The enactment
of both Acts laid crucial groundwork for a successful twenty-first
century right to roam by recognizing public rights of access to land
held in common for "air and exercise" and encouraging private
landowners to "enter agreements that granted the public access
rights over private lands with local authorities."8 7 Finally, in 2000,
Great Britain enacted a right to roam in the Countryside and
Rights of Way Act (CRoW). CRoW "classifies private land that
contains mountains, moors, heath, or downland as 'open country,'
and requires landowners to allow the public to roam freely across
these lands." 88 CRoW opens up millions of acres of classified
private land to the public, allowing people to partake in outdoor
recreation. 89 Private landowners who have lost their right to
exclude public access to their land do not receive any compensation
for this limitation on their right to exclude. 90 CRoW was
successfully enacted due to a number of factors, but most
importantly, there is a longstanding history and culture
surrounding the right to roam the British countryside, allowing
1
the public to fully enjoy its amenities.
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Jerry Anderson, a law professor at Drake University Law
School writes that, "numerous public footpaths crisscross private
lands, and both the government and private groups ... zealously
guard these rights-of-way against encroachment. Under a theory
of implied dedication, British courts have consistently recognized
the public's continued enjoyment of common rights to certain
private lands historically used by the citizenry." 92 CROW was
enacted to help resolve the longstanding negative reaction by
British citizens to an extended period of enclosure of private
lands. 9 3 The backlash to the enclosure of private lands can be
explained as class outrage at the enclosure of what had long been
considered the commons. 94 "Enclosure converted communal land
into private land, profoundly affecting commoners' rights and
English society in general."9 5 The loss of a general right to roam in
Great Britain resulted in public outcry and protest against
enclosure of the commons. 9 6 Parliament listened to the public
discontent and responded with "a gradual shift back to greater"
public access. 97 CRoW should not be viewed as a "radical
nationalization of private property rights," because it was enacted
to "regain a balance," that was lost "between public and private
rights to land during the enclosure period."9 8
The mechanics of CRoW involve a classification of land as
either "common land" or "open country" before public access can be
granted. 99 The public may freely enter appropriately classified
lands in order to enjoy outdoor recreation, as long as they do not
damage any gates or fences. 100 This access is granted primarily "for
walking and picnicking; one may not hunt, light a fire, swim in ...
waters, remove plants or trees, ride a bicycle or horse, or disrupt
lawful activities on the land." 101 There are several specific
limitations to CRoW's right to roam beyond those mentioned
above. For example, the right to roam does not apply to bodies of
freshwater, cultivated agricultural areas or sports fields (golf

92 Id.
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courses).102 Hikers are limited to traveling on foot and are also
prohibited from accessing land within 60 feet of a dwelling,
including "parks and gardens, thereby creating a 'privacy zone' for
10 3
landowners in the ground adjacent to their homes."
Landowners, in turn, must give the public open access to
their properties with no posting stating otherwise. 104 Under
CRoW, private landowners "are exempt from tort liability for harm
to hikers caused by natural features of the property or resulting
from an improper use of gates, fences, or walls.10 5 This exemption
of tort liability does not extend to obstacles and risks on the land
that have been intentionally or recklessly created and, as a result,
cause harm to hikers.10 6 "For example, if an owner releases her
cattle to graze on the property and one cow attacks a visitor, the
owner would be held liable for the injury sustained by the
visitor." 0 7

While CRoW has been successfully implemented and in
place for almost eighteen years in Great Britain, it would be unfair
to ignore a glaring negative result of the enactment. Through a
carefully executed and extensive study done in 2017, law
professors Jonathan Klick and Gideon Parchomovsky set out to
measure the value of the right to exclude to private property
owners by analyzing the effect of CRoW legislation in England on
"property values by comparing affected and non-affected parcels
before and after the legislation." 108 Klick and Parchomovsky
"found that the formalization of the right to roam, though only
minimally invasive, led to a statistically significant and
09
substantively important drop in property values." However, it is
also important to recognize that although implementation of the
right to roam may lead to a decline in individuals' property value,
it is necessary to engage in a cost-benefit analysis and "to evaluate
the benefit that may arise from increasing public access to private
property."110
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B. The Right to Roam in Scotland andScandinavia
Surprisingly, the amount of public access granted under
CRoW pales in comparison to the scope of the right to roam in
Scotland and Scandinavian countries. In Scotland, the right to
roam was established by the Land Reform Scotland Act of 2003
and "covers the entire territory of the country" with fewer
"exclusions and exemptions" in place than CRoW." 1 Specifically,
the right to roam in Scotland permits public access to "grassy
sports fields" and allows a much wider range of activities, like
"such activities as organized educational tours, orienteering,
bicycle riding, rock climbing, swimming, and camping." 112 Notably,
the Scottish legislature avoids bright-line rules demarcating the
exact distance at which hikers must stay away from private
landowner's dwellings.1 13 Instead, it requires that hikers provide
owners with a "reasonable measure of privacy and refrain from
unreasonably disturbing them" and private landowners can
exclude visitors "only to the extent necessary to give them a
reasonable degree of privacy in their homes."" 4 The downside to
an unclear "privacy zone" for landowners has "created uncertainty
as to the precise scope of the right and has necessitated judicial
intervention in some cases."115
Scandinavian countries have expanded the scope of the
right to roam even further than the Land Reform Scotland Act of
2003 and Great Britain's CRoW. The right to roam can be traced
to "ancient historic roots and is widely known as 'everyman's
right,"' or allemansratten.116 The public are granted access and
encouraged to partake in recreational activities on land and water
alike, allowing "swimming, sailing, canoeing, and rowing." 117
Hikers are also allowed to gather "berries, flowers, and mushroom"
for consumption, and have permission to set up tents and camp "for
up to two days ... as long as tents are positioned at least 500 feet
away from the nearest house and the privacy of the landowners is
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respected."1 18 Norway codified the customary right to roam in 1957
under the Outdoor Recreation Act, allowing landowners to exclude
the public from cultivated land known as innmark, unless it is
covered by snow. 119 All other land, called utmark, is open to the
public. 120 Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Switzerland,
Austria, and even Germany have different variations of the right
to roam, however, all balance the landowner's interests against the
121
Also, "the right to roam
public's interest in outdoor recreation.
to anything that would
nor
garden,
and
home
to
never extends
122
damage the land, including grazing or motorsports."
While there are clear disadvantages to the codification of
the right to roam, as evidenced in Professors Klick and
Parchomovsky's empirical study, the right to roam has proven to
be successful as a mainstay in European property law doctrine.
With some countries never straying from the right to roam, and
others experiencing a rebirth of this recognition of public access to
private property, the right to roam stands as an impressive
example of what could be in other countries.
IV. THE RIGHT TO ROAM AS APPLIED
TO THE APPALACHIAN TRAIL
While there is an abundance of case law on the right to
exclude and several academic articles written on different aspects
of the right to roam,.-none address the possibility of applying the
right to roam to the AT or other famous long-distance hiking trails.
Past and present private land ownership disputes with the
government have created chronic resentment among residents of
communities surrounding the trail, occasionally resulting in
vandalism against hikers and destruction of the trail itself.
Applying the right to roam to the AT would foster an improved
relationship between private landowners and the trail, resulting
in safer conditions for those enjoying the trail, diminished need for
government implementation of eminent domain, and better
conservation of the "national significant scenic, historic, natural or
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cultural qualities of the trail itself."1 23 This Note argues that a
right to roam on the AT could and should be adopted through an
amendment to the National Trails System Act of 1968 as a solution
to the problems hikers, landowners, and the government face.
Establishing a right to roam on the Appalachian Trail is one
of the only viable and resolute solutions that would successfully
replace the government's need to exercise condemnation
proceedings on private landowners along the trail. 16 USCA §
1246(g) of the National Trails System Act explains that "the
appropriate Secretary may utilize condemnation proceedings
without the consent of the owner to acquire private lands or
interests therein pursuant to this section only in cases where, in
his judgment, all reasonable efforts to acquire such lands or
interests therein by negotiation have failed, and in such cases he
shall acquire only such title as, in his judgment, is reasonably
necessary to provide passage across such lands." 24 There are well
established and accepted alternatives to eminent domain used
extensively to create the AT, however, none provide the optimal
answer. The AT is a singular phenomenon in the United States,
which begs a tailored and unique application of property law that
is unnecessary for less populated long-distance hiking trails like
the Pacific Crest Trail, which was established long after much of
the western lands it winds through were amassed through
government acquisition and held for public use. The right to roam
offers a consistent, efficient, and simple alternative to the
contentious use of condemnation and the tedious creation of piecemeal easements along its 2,180-mile length.
Three notable and unique characteristics are attributable
to the right to roam, setting it apart from other property law
doctrines. First, "the right to roam implicates a relatively minimal
intrusion on owners' right to exclude." 125 This allows private
property owners to maintain ownership of their land while
tailoring the use of the land to the specific needs of both the hiker
and the landowner, ensuring "that hikers do not interfere with
owners' possession or use rights." 126 This characteristic is of
particular significance with regard to the AT because most
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condemnation proceedings along the trail have occurred with
respect to unimproved private property, that is "land that does not
have certain basic required services necessary to utilize it for other
purposes." 127 In other words, unimproved property does not
include electricity, street access, water, or telephone services, and
unless the landowner has pitched a tent or built a rustic cabin, no
one is living on the land. In effect, the right to roam would grant
an average reciprocity of advantage to both the landowner and the
AT, allowing the private landowner to retain ownership of the
land, with the AT providing a minimally intrusive route for hikers
through a piece or section of their land. After analyzing Professors
Klick and Parchomovsky's empirical study on declining land value
after implementation of CRoW in England, some may argue that
even this minimal intrusion will cause a decrease in the value of
their land. 128 However, the footpaths and trails of CRoW
frequently pass through land occupied by private homes and
estates, in contrast to the route of the AT, where it is rare to run
into any personal residence situated near forests and mountains.
In fact, it can be argued that the existence of the AT near a tract
of private property could provide a valuable opportunity for the
landowner. The development potential is less limited with a right
to roam, as "the landowner can develop the parcel into a restaurant
or guesthouse," or hostel, whereas without the right to roam, there
129
is very little ability to profit from such a tract of land.
Second, implementing a right to roam provides greater
efficiency and justice, as "it is often necessary to gain access to
130
multiple parcels to complete a certain hike or trail." When the
general public attempts to access the right to gain entry onto
private land by using "voluntary market transactions," they would
very likely run into the dual problems of "high transaction costs
and strategic holdouts."1 3 Strategic holdouts occur when private
landowners refuse any offer in an effort to gain as much bargaining
power as possible, leading to a larger payout for them at the end of
the deal. In the case of the AT, these strategic holdouts might not
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be so smart because the government will resort to condemnation
proceedings to acquire the land at market value, which is often less
valuable than the special sentiment that the land provides the
owner. Also, many find distributive justice in the right to roam
because it "benefits the public at large at the expense of potentially
affluent property owners by making the latter's lots subject to
roaming rights." 132
Third, the right to roam has been codified in England,
Wales, and Scotland, all of which are common law countries who
share an analogous history in property to the United States. 133 The
Constitution's Fifth Amendment "Takings Clause," which states
that private property shall not be "taken for public use, without
just compensation," 13 4 presents a glaring challenge to the right to
roam's lack of compensation to private landowners who give up an
all-encompassing right to exclude, the right to roam arguably
conforms to historic principles of property law discussed in Part II
of this note, negating any potential conflict with the constitution.
Moreover, the right to roam's origins as a background principle of
law paired with the recent reemergence of the progressive property
movement, reducing a landowner's right to exclude along the AT
by introducing the right to roam does not require a revolution in
thought about American property law.
As a movement "predicated on the idea that property, like
all other legal institutions, should advance human flourishing,"
progressive property advocates maintain that property policy must
recognize both the needs of landowner and society at large. 135 The
property owner's right to exclude is meaningful, but it must
sometimes give way to broader needs and values, thus "endorsing
a pluralistic vision of property." 13 6 Under this vision, property
should "advance a wide range of values," spanning from individual
interests to "social interests, such as environmental stewardship,
civic responsibility, and aggregate wealth," to general interests.137
As a result of such a pluralistic vision, it follows that the right to
exclude does not represent the full essence of American property

132

Id.

133

136

See id.
CONsT. amend. V.
Kick & Parchomovsky, supra note 27, at 936-37.
Id. at 934.

137

Id.

134 U.S.
135

2017-20181

FISHHOOKS AND TRIPWIRE

301

law. 138 "The emergence of the progressive property movement has
resurrected the 'bundle of rights' property law analogy and has put
renewed pressure to scale back the right to exclude."1 39 While the
right to roam embodies many of the values approved by the
progressive property movement, it also offers a tailored solution to
the issues currently plaguing landowners along the route of the
AT, those hiking the AT, and the AT itself.
CONCLUSION

This note does not attempt to argue that a nationwide
adoption of the right to roam in America would be successful, or
even a good idea. Instead, this note posits that the Appalachian
Trail is suffering from the inconsistent and inefficient application
of current American property law doctrines, specifically,
condemnation proceedings against private landowners as
explained in § 1246 of The National Trails System Act, 1 40 and that
a particularized implementation of the right to roam to the
Appalachian Trail would remedy the negative effects created by
the government's use of eminent domain. Applying the right to
roam to the Appalachian Trail would allow private landowners to
maintain possession of their land while also granting a narrow and
minimally intrusive right-of-way to hikers passing through.
Eliminating the need for condemnation proceedings and instead
fostering an average reciprocity of advantage through the right to
roam would lessen landowner and local community resentment
against the Appalachian Trail and its hikers. As a result, the right
to roam might appease private landowners in the long term,
allowing them to maintain ownership over property that has been
in their family for centuries, while also protecting the environment
encompassing the trail and those enjoying it from acts of
vandalism.
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